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This paper discusses a model of vertical and horizontal product diﬀerenti-
ation within the Dixit-Stiglitz framework of monopolistic competition. Firms
compete not only in prices and horizontal attributes of their products, but
also in the quality that can be controlled by R&D activities. Based upon the
results of a general equilibrium model, intra-sectoral trade and the welfare im-
plications of public intervention in terms of research promotion are considered.
The analysis involves a numerical application to ten basic European industries.
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2026.1 Introduction
The concept of monopolistic competition has enjoyed great popularity since the
seminal work of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) – the beginning of the "second monopo-
listic revolution", as contemplated by Brakman and Heijdra (2004). This idea has
penetrated diﬀerent ﬁelds of research. Basic models of international trade utilize
the monopolistically competitive framework (e.g., Krugman (1979, 1980), Dixit and
Norman (1980)) as well as fundamental contributions within the endogenous growth
literature (e.g., Romer (1987, 1990), Lucas (1988)).
An essential attribute in models of monopolistic competition is horizontal prod-
uct diﬀerentiation, as described by Hotelling (1929) and advanced by Chamberlin
(1933). Beside diﬀerentiation in terms of product characteristics (e.g., design, color
or taste), newer literature considers quality as an additional vertical dimension of
product space.1 The corresponding branch of industrial organization was originated
by Shaked and Sutton (1982, 1983, 1987) and Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979, 1980).
Following the classiﬁcation of Sutton (1991), Schmalensee (1992) distinguished Type
1 and Type 2 industries. While a Type 1 industry is characterized by horizontally
diﬀerentiated (or homogenous) products, Type 2 ﬁrms compete not only in price
and horizontal product attributes, but also in perceived quality. In this context,
quality is inﬂuenced by R&D expenditures, so that a ﬁrm may increase its market
share by increasing the quality of its product.
Beyond the oligopolistic market structures and the game-theoretical perspective of
this ﬁeld of Industrial Organization, this paper aims to establish a basic model of
vertical product diﬀerentiation for further implementation in international trade.
The main assumptions underlying this paper are referenced to the New Economic
Geography (NEG). Initially introduced by Krugman (1991), the NEG aims to ex-
plain industrial agglomeration using the framework of monopolistic competition à
la Dixit Stiglitz. The model here incorporates explicitly R&D activities, beyond the
"anonymous" consideration within the ﬁxed factor usually exercised in the NEG
literature.2
Furthermore, we include endogenous quality in the seminal model of Dixit and
Stiglitz (1977), and analyze both vertical and horizontal product diﬀerentiation.
In order to consider the impact of R&D from a macroeconomic point of view, we
design a general equilibrium model, where households oﬀer unskilled labor and re-
search personnel. Detached from an analysis of particular product markets, with a
1Furthermore, product diﬀerentiation is formalized by the Goods Characteristics approach, as
pioneered by Lancaster (1966). See Tirole (1988), Chapter 2.
2See for instance the Footloose Entrepreneur Model of Ottaviano (1996) and Forslid (1999),
where the ﬁxed factor or human capital is inter-regionally mobile.
1focus on the mechanisms in aggregates, we have chosen monopolistic competition,
rather than the oligopolistic market structures that are discussed in the literature
of Industrial Organization. This paper introduces the potential to model an explicit
R&D sector and the analysis of economic policy instruments in terms of research
promotion. Finally, we analyze the allocation outcome in the presence of vertical
linkages by introducing a simple input-output relationship between ﬁrms in the man-
ufacturing sector.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we build the basic model with
one manufacturing industry. After partial-analytic analysis, we extend the model to
endogenous wages and income, as well as a separate research sector. In Section 3,
we introduce intermediate trade within the manufacturing sector and consider the
comparative statics of market concentration and quality with respect to ﬁxed costs.
Section 4 discusses three policy instruments and their implications for social welfare:
a) minimum quality standards, b) the control of research costs, and c) the optimal
supply in the market for R&D services. A numerical application of the model to real
economic data appears in Section 5: for ten European basic industries we compute
quality, marginal research costs, and research elasticities. Finally, Section 6 presents
a concluding discussion of the main ﬁndings and an outlook for future work.
2 The Model
Private Demand
Private households consume two types of goods: a) a homogenous good A produced
by a Walrasian constant-return sector (often known as the agricultural sector), and
b) diﬀerentiated industrial products provided by a manufacturing sector.3 Consumer















; ¾ > 1 ;ui > 0: (2)
While xi is the quantity consumed of variety i, ui denotes a product-speciﬁc utility
parameter, henceforth labeled product quality, and ¾ is the constant substitution
3Henceforth, the traditional sector is treated as the numeraire.
2elasticity between varieties.4 Applying Two-Stage Budgeting, we obtain the demand
function for a representative industrial product sort:
x
D = ¹Y up
¡¾P
¾¡1; (3)
where ¹Y represents the share in household income for industrial products, and p










As it is easy to reproduce, the demand elasticity in terms of quantity is constant
at ¾, and in terms of quality it is 1. Interestingly, the price index contains infor-
mation about product quality as a result of its being the minimum cost for a given
subutility M. The higher the quality at constant prices, the lower the consumer
costs for reaching a certain level of satisfaction. The demand increases linearly with
respect to rising product quality, which results from constant substitution elasticity.
Assuming a representative variety, substitution of (4) in (3) reveals a demand that
depends upon market size, price, and ﬁrm number, but is independent of product
quality.
Industrial Supply
Turning to the supply side of this model, the production of a particular variety re-
quires labor as the only input. The corresponding factor requirement is characterized
by a ﬁxed and variable cost:
l
M = F + ax; (5)
where M is mnemonic for manufacturing. Because of economies of scale and con-
sumer preference for diversity, it is proﬁtable for each ﬁrm to produce only one
diﬀerentiated variety, so that the ﬁrm number is equal to the number of available
product sorts. In addition to production, ﬁrms have a capacity for undertaking
research activities. According to Sutton (1991), ﬁrms can control their product
quality by research investments. In contrast with the original Dixit-Stiglitz frame-
work, the proposed model producers have an additional degree of freedom to build
up a monopolistic scope, in addition to horizontal product diﬀerentiation. Attaining
4The functional form of the subutility is based upon the numerical example of Sutton (1991),
p. 48 et seq..






° ; ° > 1: (6)
The parameter, r, represents a constant cost rate and ° the research elasticity. The
research expenditure function shows a deterministic relation. Furthermore, it is con-
vex, implying that increasing product quality requires more and more investments.
After all, research is essential; – otherwise, product quality and simultaneously de-
mand become zero.5 The proﬁt function of a manufacturing ﬁrm is given by:
¼ = px ¡ R ¡ wF ¡ wax; (7)









where the term in brackets is the monopolistic price mark-up, beyond the marginal
production cost. Normalizing the variable production coeﬃcient, a, by (¾ ¡ 1)=¾,
the proﬁt maximizing price becomes w.6
The optimum research policy can be derived from the ﬁrst derivative of the proﬁt
function with respect to quality:
¹Y up
¡¾P
¾¡1 (p ¡ wa) = ru
°: (9)
The term on the right-hand side of (9) represents the marginal research cost of
increasing product quality, which can also be expressed as °R. The left-hand side
shows the increase of the operating proﬁt (proﬁt less research costs), in response to









The choice of quality depends upon two factors: (a) research cost, and (b) degree
of competition. The higher the cost rate, r, the lower is the product quality due
5Sutton (1991) assumes a minimum product quality of 1, even if no research is undertaken. For
analytical convenience, we simplify this proposition.
6See Fujita et al. (1999), p.54 et seq..
4to the optimum rule in (9). Decreasing competitive pressure may result from an
increase of market size, a lower substitution elasticity, or a higher proﬁt maximizing
price; then ﬁrms compete in quality rather than in prices. In other words, ﬁrms
expand their research activities as the degree of competition decreases. The ﬁrm
behavior, in terms of ﬁrm number and quality, aﬀects demand via the price index.
An increase in ﬁrm number or competitive quality reduces the price index and thus
the demand on a particular ﬁrm. Finally, the ﬁrm does not have funds to meet









Equation (11) provides central information: the interdependency between market
concentration (measured in number of ﬁrms) and product quality. The correspond-







The long run equilibrium is characterized by free market entry and exit, and thus,
a variable ﬁrm number. From the zero-proﬁt condition, we obtain the equilibrium






Compared to the original Dixit-Stiglitz outcome, the equilibrium output depends not
only upon exogenous parameters, but also upon the research expenditure. Therefore,
ﬁrm size is determined by ﬁxed cost of production, as well as by research expenditure




= F + ax








Because of the partial-analytic attribute of this model, the labor market is in equi-
librium at the wage rate, w, so that labor supply is equal to the labor requirement

























Considering the model from a macroeconomic point of view, we adopt a simple
general equilibrium framework. To internalize wages and income, we introduce a
separate R&D sector receiving the corresponding expenditures of the manufacturing
industry. We assume a linear constant-return technology, where one unit of R&D
requires one unit of scientiﬁc input (e.g. research staﬀ).8 The traditional sector
uses unskilled labor as input within a linear technology, where one unit of labor
generates one unit of output. Because the homogenous good is the numeraire, the
corresponding price is set to 1.
The long run GDP of the economy consists of the labor income, the agricultural
revenues, and the earnings of the R&D sector:
Y = wL
M + L
A + nR: (16)
Following Fujita et al. (1999), we normalize the manufacturing workforce, LM, with
¸, and the agricultural workforce, LA, with 1¡¸, so that the total supply of unqual-
iﬁed labor is given by: L = LM + LA. Hence, the income becomes: Y = w + nR.
We assume an inelastic labor supply, so that wages come from the so-called wage
equation that determines the wage at which ﬁrms break even:
x
S = ¹Y up
¡¾P
¾¡1: (17)
This equality provides two essential conditions: the instant and simultaneous clear-
ing of the factor market and of the product market. Solving this expression for the









We allow inter-sectoral labor allocation, so that the equilibrium wage rate is equal to
1. Turning to the R&D sector, the cost rate, r, results from the market equilibrium
of research services: rLR = nR. Using equation (12) and setting the total supply of





8In fact, instead of considering an autonomous sector, it may be possible to regard R&D as an
in-house process of the manufacturing industry that is staﬀed from a particular labor market.
6Equation (19) implies important results: a) the cost rate increases with increasing
market size and decreasing homogeneity of downstream products, b) it decreases
with rising research elasticity. The ﬁrst comes from the ﬁrm’s quality policy, where
the research expenditures rise with a lower degree of competition. The second is the






Substituting this expression, in combination with the price index and the equilibrium









































From (22) one can see, that ﬁrm size depends upon exogenous parameters, but is
times the term in brackets higher than the ﬁrm size of the original Dixit-Stiglitz
model. In addition, the higher °, implies that the more expensive the quality im-
provement, the lower the ﬁrm size, as a result of a higher price competition, and








7The lower the ﬁrm number, the higher the research expenditures and product quality.
The reason is straightforward: a decreasing ﬁrm number increases demand and
proﬁts due to the price index. Because research is ﬁnanced by sales revenues, the
capacity for R&D investments expands and thus increases product quality. The
opposite relationship can be derived from the market clearing condition npx = ¹Y .
The ﬁrm number with respect to quality is given by:
n =
¹° (° ¡ 1)(¾° ¡ ¹)
°2¾F (¾° ¡ ¹) ¡ ¹2 (° ¡ 1)u°: (27)
The simple market size argument indicates that product quality increases the ﬁrm
number: the higher the quality, the higher the R&D expenditures and thus the corre-
sponding household income, which increases the market size and results in new ﬁrm
entries.9 The overall relationship between quality and ﬁrm number complies with











As is apparent in equation (28), R&D intensity is negatively correlated with ﬁrm
number. In the equilibrium, it is dependent upon substitution and research elas-
ticity only, implying that R&D intensity declines with increasing homogeneity of
products and increasing research eﬀort.
Stability of Equilibrium
We assume free market entry and exit in response to ﬁrm proﬁts, following the
adjustment process: _ n = f (¼);f(0) = 0;f0 > 0.10 We consider the case where an
additional ﬁrm decides to enter the market. Consequently, the price index decreases,
thus reducing demand for a particular variety. Without quality improvement, ﬁrms
see losses due to constant output, which eventually lead to market exits. But be-
cause ﬁrms have the capacity to improve quality by research investments, they may
counteract this development. A higher ﬁrm number reduces the ﬁnancial resources
for R&D via price index, as mentioned above. Hence, product quality, demand, and
proﬁts decrease. The results are ﬁrm exits and a return to the former equilibrium.






, that is always below the equilibrium value
(24).
10See Neary (2001).
8This phenomenon can be illustrated by totally diﬀerentiating the proﬁt function














Firm proﬁts respond only to changes in demand and quality, while they are not
aﬀected by prices due to the price-setting rule. An increase in demand always gives
rise to proﬁts, and thus, to the market entry of new ﬁrms. The same applies with
quality improvement. This dependency becomes apparent by expressing the proﬁt







° ¡ wF: (30)
The upper diagram in Figure 1 shows the proﬁt function (30) with parameter settings
° = 2, r = 1, F = 1, and ¹ = 0:2, ¾ = 2, for the lower diagram, respectively.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
According to the total diﬀerential (29), an increase in product quality out of the
equilibrium makes proﬁts increase due to rising demand, leading to market entries
of new ﬁrms. As given by equation (26), a decreasing market concentration is
accompanied by lower R&D investments, reducing the product quality, until the
equilibrium is again reached.
3 Vertical Linkages
In this section, we extend the model by a simple input-output structure, where the
manufacturing industry uses diﬀerentiated intermediate products from an imperfect
upstream sector, in accordance with Ethier (1982). Instead of considering two sep-
arate sectors, we aggregate them to one manufacturing industry, as practised by
Krugman and Venables (1995). With this approach, vertical linkages become hor-
izontal, and inter-sectoral allocation intra-sectoral. The major implications are: a)
the industry uses a ﬁxed proportion of its output as input again, b) the technical
substitution elasticity for intermediates is identical to ¾, c) ﬁrms have the same
11See Appendix.
9quality preferences as consumers, and d) the price index for intermediates is the
same as for ﬁnal products. The corresponding production function is:
F + ax = Zl
1¡®I










where Z represents a level parameter, which is normalized by (1 ¡ ®)
®¡1 ®¡®, and
I an input composite of a continuum of diﬀerentiated products. From two-stage
budgeting, we obtain the cost function, which is the analogue of the expenditure
function of consumers:
C = (F + ax)w
1¡®P
® + R: (32)
The intermediate demand function is:
x
u = ®(C ¡ R)up
¡¾P
¾¡1; (33)
where u denotes upstream. The total demand for a particular variety is composed






¾¡1 [¹Y + n®(C ¡ R)]; (34)
where the term in square brackets represents the total expenditures, E, for industrial
products. Equation (34) reﬂects the forward and backward linkages between ﬁrms.
The more ﬁrms produce in the economy, the higher the intermediate demand, which
in turn increases ﬁrm number. By contrast, as the number of ﬁrms increases, the
price index decreases, implying a decrease of procurement costs for intermediates
on one hand, and an increase of competition on the other hand. The interaction
between these two forces is crucial for the model dynamics in this section.






where the term on the right hand side describes marginal cost as a composite of























which is the same as in the model without vertical linkages. Turning to the labor








Due to inter-sectoral labor mobility, the wage rate is 1. In the research market, the









A noteworthy result is that the optimum quality (36) becomes with (38) and (40)
the simple relationship between ﬁrm number and quality, like (26) in the previous
section. For the determination of the equilibrium ﬁrm number, we bear in mind
that the total expenditures on manufacturing output are the same as the aggregate
turnover of the industry: E = npx. Using equations (32)-(40), the ﬁrm number











The ﬁrm number is unique and positive if the denominator of the term in square





which is always valid. A close look at equation (41) reveals that the impact of













11The direction of change in the ﬁrm number with respect to a change in quality is
not positive deﬁnite, as it is in equation (28). In fact, the correlation depends upon
the strength of two competing forces. Increasing quality raises R&D investments
and simultaneously consumer and intermediate demand. Additionally, the increas-
ing quality reduces the price index and dampens demand reduction, but increases
the prices again, via the monopolistic price-setting rule. The overall eﬀect implies
a net reduction of demand. In contrast, increasing quality means higher research
expenditures, implying a smaller budget for intermediates. Actually, the production





. It is apparent that a decreasing
price index results in lower production costs, reducing the intermediate demand due
to the constant cost share ®. Generally, the direction of change depends upon the
strength of the forward linkage and the direct demand eﬀect.
Turning to the second central variable, the equilibrium product quality can be de-
rived from (37), (39), and (41), leading once again to equation (26). This result, in
conjunction with the total diﬀerential of the proﬁt function (see Appendix), ensures





















At this point, we take a close look at the eﬀects of changes in the ﬁxed (production)
cost, F, on market concentration and quality. On condition of (42), the direction of

































This result diﬀers from that of the single-sector model, where the equilibrium market
concentration is positively correlated with ﬁxed cost. The reason is straightforward:
an increase in ﬁxed cost leads to a decrease in proﬁts and to an accompanying
market exit of ﬁrms. With vertical linkages, an increase in F, implying a rising
factor requirement, causes an increase in the intermediate demand, which gives rise
to ﬁrm proﬁts and market entries. The relation between cost eﬀect and forward
linkage determines the response of market concentration to the ﬁxed cost.12 The
12In the original Dixit-Stiglitz model with vertical linkages, the condition (45b) is: @n










12response of quality to changing ﬁxed cost is reversed to ﬁrm number, as it becomes
apparent at the inequality signs. As is shown in the previous section and is apparent
in the quality policy (36), ﬁrm number and quality are negatively correlated due to
the price index.
Summarizing the outcomes of this section, we can make the following statements:
1) There is a unique and deﬁnite equilibrium, due to condition (42). 2) In contrast
to the single sector model, the market clearing function (41) can also be downward
sloping. In this context, a positive (negative) slope implies weak (strong) linkages
between manufacturing ﬁrms , so that inequality (43) qualiﬁes as a measure for the
classiﬁcation of industries in terms of their sectoral coherence. 3) The equilibrium
shows a diﬀerent behavior with respect to changes in the exogenous variables, as we
have seen at the example of the ﬁxed cost, F. An economic policy must regard the
strength of the sectoral linkages, in order to meet the welfare maximizing objectives.
In the next section, we consider the impact of political instruments. Based on these
results, we derive a framework for a research-promoting policy.
4 Welfare Analysis
With respect to the allocation outcome in imperfect markets, we consider basic
economic policy instruments in this section. We depart from the view of a social
planner with the capacity to control central macroeconomic variables, but assume
rather from a practical point of view that the state has limited possibilities in its
instruments. With this approach, we determine the welfare of the market allocation
in order to compare it with a situation, in which the state disposes of the potential
to control a) the quality by minimum standards, b) the research cost rate, and c)
the supply of R&D activities.
Minimum Quality Standards
At ﬁrst, we compare the eﬀects of state-controlled quality standards with the un-












° + ¾F: (47)





° ¹ u° (¾ ¡ ¹) + ¾F
: (48)
From the research market equilibrium, we obtain 1 = n
° ¹ u°. In combination with
equation (46), the research cost rate is given by:
r =
¹¹ u° ¡ °¾F
¹ u° (¾ ¡ ¹)
: (49)
Substituting (49) into (48), yields equation (26). For establishing a socially opti-
mal quality, we choose welfare as a function of consumer utility. From household
optimization, we obtain maximum utility as the real income of households:13
W = Y P
¡¹: (50)





















¾¹ u° ¡ °¾F






The limiting values of the hyperbolic welfare function are ¡1 for u ! 0, and 0 for












It is easy to prove that the socially optimal product quality is always lower, as in the
model without regulation. Figure 2 presents the welfare function for the parameter
constellation, as in the previous illustration.
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
13We neglect the term ¹¹ (1 ¡ ¹)
1¡¹.
14The establishment of quality standards implies a welfare gain due to a reduction of
market concentration. Research investments and quality turn out to be too high
without regulation; and consequently, the ﬁrm number too low, as a result of mar-
ket imperfections.14 These ﬁndings cause several problems for real economic policy:
a) if quality is too high, minimum standards fail the welfare optimum, b) in turn,
maximum standards are not practicable, implying an indirect control via alternative
political instruments, c) variation in model premises may change these outcomes.
For example, assuming bounded rationality of consumers or information asymmetry,
could lead to systematic underestimation of quality with the result of an equilibrium
that is socially too low. Setting quality standards means a welfare maximum. In
contrast, removing these deﬁciencies on the demand side (e.g., by public informa-
tion) results in unregulated quality, that is too high again. Besides these exceptions,
we concentrate on the impact of indirect quality control by variations of the research
cost rate.
Optimal Control of Research Costs
The state can control research costs by subsidization and taxation, as well as by a
state-owned or state-regulated research sector. The argument for public interven-
tion is the failure not of the research market itself, but rather of the corresponding
downstream sector. The choice of a research cost rate is linked with excess supply
or demand, so that case diﬀerentiation is required for the derivation of the welfare
function.
First, we consider a cost rate above the equilibrium value, so that the demand for
R&D becomes a bottleneck. While household income, ﬁrm number, and ﬁrm size
remain constant, quality decreases due to the ﬁrmťs product policy. Although re-
search investments do not change, employment in the R&D sector declines. The
welfare function with respect to the research cost rate can be expressed as:
















The terms in square brackets are positive: welfare decreases monotonically with
increasing cost rate, so that a scale-up of r leads always to welfare losses.
If the cost rate is set below the equilibrium value, the demand for R&D services is








14This complies with the results of the seminal Dixit-Stiglitz model. See the introduction of
Brakman and Heijdra (2004), p. 19 et seq., for instance.
15The welfare function is now:
W (r < r













°(¾¡1) for r ! 0 and ¡1 for r ! 1.15
From (56), the welfare maximizing research cost rate is:
rmax =
¹[¹(° ¡ 1) + ¾ ¡ °]
¾ [° (¾ ¡ 1) ¡ ¹] + ¹[° ¡ ¹(° ¡ 1)]
: (57)






rmax 8 ¹(° ¡ 1) > ¾ + °
0 8 ¹(° ¡ 1) · ¾ + °:
(58)
If we complete the welfare function for the whole range of r, we must consider both
equations (54) and (56). The graphs intersect at their lower and upper limits: the
non-regulated equilibrium r¤. Overall, we obtain a continuous but non-diﬀerentiable
welfare function. Figure 3 depicts the socially optimal and unregulated research cost
rate and the corresponding welfare values with the parameters above.
[Insert Figure 3 about here]
It is a noteworthy fact that reducing quality to the optimum level, is only realizable
by a reduction of the research cost rate. This seems to be contrary to intuition and
partial analytical results. In general, this dependency can be traced to a disequi-
librium in the research market and the special characteristics of the Dixit-Stiglitz
framework. Due to a research price below the equilibrium value, the ﬁxed supply
of researchers is rationed to ﬁrmťs increased demand. Research investments, R,
become r=n. Consequently, these expenditures begin to decrease and overall ﬁxed
costs decline. As a result, decreasing average costs and constant break even output
cause an entry of new ﬁrms. The increased ﬁrm number and lower research ex-
penditures correspond with decreasing quality, as equation (26) indicates. Finally,











holds, the codomain of r is ]0;
¹
¾¡¹[ due to a negative root. The upper
limit is greater than the equilibrium cost rate without regulation, so that it is not a part of the
total (piecewise-deﬁned) welfare function (54) and (56).
16unregulated equilibrium. The decrease of the price index more than compensates
for the decrease of the nominal household income.16
Supply of Research Activities
An alternative policy instrument exists in the control of the supply of R&D services
and scientiﬁc personnel. In practice, activities range from a totally state-controlled
research sector to direct promotion (e.g., by funding programs). We intentionally
neglect the ﬁnancing of public market intervention, but rather consider the impact
on allocation and welfare.
In Section 2, we set the price inelastic supply of R&D equal to 1. Here we relax
this restriction and allow LR to be non-zero positive. As a result, the equilibrium




LR (¾° ¡ ¹)
; (59)










In general, with increasing research supply, ﬁrms are able to improve quality without
increasing their research investments, so that market concentration and ﬁrm size
remain unchanged. If the ﬁrm number is constant with increasing quality, the price
index declines, ultimately increasing real income and welfare. These results imply
that an increase in R&D supply leads to better quality with unaﬀected market
concentration. However, an economic policy may increase social welfare, but it fails
to meet the welfare maximum.
5 Numerical Application
In this section, we adapt the modeling results to real economic data and aim to deter-
mine quality and research costs for selected European industries. The required data,
extracted from the EUROSTAT online data base, contain ﬁrm number, turnover,
and estimated R&D expenditures for 2003. For the corresponding substitution elas-
ticities, we use the OLS-estimated values of Hummels (1999), Table 4. For the
simulation, we make the following assumptions:









0, where the denominator of the second fraction is always positive (see equation (54)).
17² We assume monopolistic competition for the industry to be considered. For
this case, we must choose a suﬃcient degree of aggregation to avoid monopo-
listic or oligopolistic market structures and corresponding deviations from the
model of symmetric and independently acting (one product) ﬁrms. On this
note, we must solve a trade-oﬀ, where a too-high aggregation leads to substi-
tution elasticities that tend to be too low (smaller than 1). In this simulation,
we choose two-digit industries, in one case, a three-digit industry.
² Implementing a general equilibrium model requires the consideration of multi-
ple industries. In this case, we choose a particular industry to analyze within
the manufacturing sector of the model and adopt the Walrasian sector for
the others. Hence, we assume a competitive market structure for the residual
economy.
² Through inter-sectoral mobility, we allow workers to move between sectors.
This may be critical, depending on type of work and industry.
² Because we simulate a closed economy, international trade relations are ex-
cluded. For the deﬁnition of an economic area with a high degree of domestic
trade, we choose the European Union (EU-25) and neglect its transcontinental
trade.
² With regard to R&D, we assume a 1:1 relationship between research and the
manufacturing sector, and thus neglect cross-sectoral research activities and
potential spill-over eﬀects, just as we do not allow for knowledge exchange
between ﬁrms.
² R&D investments are employed only for quality improvements, including also
the design of new and improved products. Research activities for cost reduc-
tion cannot be separated from the oﬃcial statistic data and are inevitably
integrated in the R&D expenditures.
² Finally, we rule out any public interventions and assume inﬁnitely fast adjust-
ment processes, as well as an instantaneous and deterministic eﬀect of R&D
on quality.
Table 1 reveals the simulation output for ten industries. For the computation of
research elasticity, equation (30) is used. The research cost rate r is determined
by equation (23), where the income share for manufactures, ¹, is the ratio of the
respective industrial turnover and the GDP (2003) earned in the EU-25. With the
values for r and °, quality can be computed with the use of equation (6). The
marginal research costs come from the derivative of the same equation.
18[Insert Table 1 about here]
Results
Overall, we obtain only a rough estimation for the magnitudes of calibrated real
parameters. Having at ﬁrst a look at the quality column, we obtain a widely
spread distribution. It is obvious that quality correlates with R&D intensity, where
research-intensive branches (e.g., Pharmaceutics or Computers) show large values
for quality.
Research elasticities indicate strong divergence across the industries. The parameter
tends to be high for branches with a low research intensity (e.g., Foods, Basic Met-
als and Metal Manufactures) versus research-intensive sectors with a high ° (e.g.,
Pharmaceutics or Computers). In this context, we observe a relatively distinct rela-
tionship between substitution and research elasticity, where a low ¾, which indicates
a high product diﬀerentiation, corresponds with a high °. This indication leads to
the assumption that R&D investments are used not only for quality improvements,
but also for horizontal product diﬀerentiation.
Furthermore, we observe large diﬀerences for the research cost rate, r: the highest
values are in the Automotive and Pharmaceutical industries, the lowest value are in
Metal Production and Metal Manufactures. An obvious reason might be the lower
demand for R&D services and personnel in the latter cases.
The column headed with @R=@u shows marginal research costs. Again, the lowest
values correspond with the highest research intensities (e.g., Pharmaceutics, Com-
puters and Medical Instruments).
Finally, the last column displays the welfare-maximizing research cost rate, in accor-
dance with equations (57) and (58). It is apparent that these values are low, if not
0. Based on these results, an economic policy should decrease the cost rates to the
particular values. This result implies almost costless research for reducing quality to
the welfare maximum level, a result that is arguable in the context of real markets.
The next section discusses this issue, summarizes the most important outcomes of
this paper, and presents an outlook for future research.
6 Conclusions
In the course of this paper, several results conﬁrm an inverse relationship between
market concentration and research intensity in monopolistic competitive markets.
Equation (26), the zero-proﬁt condition, shows a simple relationship between ﬁrm
number and quality, controlled by the exogenous research elasticity. Furthermore,
this paper illustrates the opposite dependence in (28), where quality determines
19market size and thus ﬁrm number. The interaction between these two mechanisms
generates an equilibrium, where ﬁrm number increases with increasing research elas-
ticity, a higher degree of horizontal diﬀerentiation, and a lower production ﬁxed cost.
In contrast, quality increases with lower research, higher substitution elasticity, and
increasing ﬁxed cost. In this context, we explored the possibility that in equilibrium
research intensity is determined by only research and substitution elasticity.
The implementation of vertical linkages leads to partially diﬀerent results. We ob-
tain a unique and globally stable equilibrium, and equation (26) remains unchanged.
However, the outcomes of the comparative statics depend upon the strength of the
vertical linkages.
Political intervention is legitimatized by a welfare loss due to imperfect markets.
We have determined that unregulated quality is above the social optimum, with the
implication that minimum quality standards do not impact the allocation outcome.
An alternative instrument is the price control of R&D services. Surprisingly, the
research cost rate must be reduced to meet the lower welfare maximizing quality.
As a consequence, ﬁrm number increases, thus reducing the price index at constant
nominal household income, ultimately implying a higher real income. An increase
in R&D capacities leads to an increase in welfare but not to the corresponding max-
imum. Ultimately, a social planner that aims to reach a certain level of maximized
welfare is supposed to combine research price instruments with an adapted control
of R&D supply.
The numerical application was conceived to quantify the magnitude of the model
outcomes with the imputation of real data, considering the strong restriction of the
underlying assumptions. It may be pointed out that an advanced simulation anal-
ysis using statistical data requires a detailed econometric foundation. However, the
results computed in this paper reveal a wide spread in quality across the correspond-
ing industries. Using the suggested approach, we consider aggregates of industries
and products. The results tend to be suﬃcient to compare diﬀerentiated products
within one sector, but less adequate for comparison across industries (e.g., cars and
computers). Based on the outcomes of this simulation, the welfare maximizing re-
search cost rate would be zero, or almost zero. In consideration of these extreme
results, we must keep in mind that the policy here aims to correct market failures
and not to promote technology development, for example.
In the face of the underlying assumptions, the model has two weaknesses: a) the
industry-speciﬁc R&D sector, and b) the absence of knowledge spillover eﬀects. In-
deed, the model could describe a more realistic picture if we implement R&D that
supplies several sectors, as it is observable in ﬁelds of fundamental research. Like-
wise, it may be interesting to consider the internal R&D of one ﬁrm that generates
externalities for other ﬁrms in the corresponding industry. In this context, the qual-















However, these issues will be part of future work.
This paper is intended to provide a foundation for implementing vertical product
diﬀerentiation and R&D for international trade. It opens the possibility of analyzing
the impact of trade integration on quality and research investments, and, in turn,
the eﬀects of R&D on spatial concentration and specialization. Based on the exten-
sions, we can model the implications of factor mobility (even in terms of scientiﬁc
labor force) and agglomeration by inter-sectoral linkages. Furthermore, on the basis
of the policy instruments considered in this paper, we can determine the impact
of quality standards as trade barriers, and draw conclusions for a location-oriented
R&D policy.
7 Technical Appendix
Derivation of Cost Function and Intermediate Demand
























The upper stage of optimization is given by:
min: C = PI + wl + R s:t: F + ax = Zl
1¡®I
®: (63)














21Equation (65) can now be inserted into the compensated intermediate demand (62),
from which the intermediate demand function (33) follows.
Total Diﬀerential of the Proﬁt Function
Starting from the proﬁt function:
¼ = ¹Y up
1¡¾P
¾¡1 ¡ aw¹Y up
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and substituting w + nr
°u° for the income and p(nu)
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Equation (68) describes the dependency between n and u. If we set
¹
¾°¡¹ for r, and
substitute (68) into the (67), totally diﬀerentiating the proﬁt function yields the
expression (29).


















¹ ¡ (°¾ ¡ ®(°¾ ¡ 1))












As in the model without linkages, proﬁts and ﬁrm number respond positively on
demand and quality. For a further detailed analysis of the disaggregated model, see
Kranich (2006).
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Figure 1: Quality and Firm Number










































Figure 2: Quality and Welfare
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